Abstract
Introduction
Network-borne attacks are currently major threats to information security. As an important technique in the defense-in-depth network security framework, intrusion detection has become a widely studied topic in computer networks in recent years [1] . In general, the techniques for intrusion detection fall into two major categories: signature-based detection and anomaly detection. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can also be categorized as host-based IDSs and network-based IDSs according to the target environment for detection. Host-based IDSs usually monitor the host system behavior by examining the information of the system, such as CPU time, system calls and command sequences. Network-based IDSs, on the other hand, monitor network behavior usually by examining the content (e.g., payload) as well as some statistical attributes of network traffic. In 1999, Lee et al. [2] constructed 41 attributes from raw traffic data (i.e., tcpdump files) to build classification models for network based intrusion detection. The raw traffic data was collected at MIT Lincoln Laboratory for the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation program [3] . The 41 attributes have been shown effective for network intrusion detection [2] and the attribute sets of the network traffic have also been used as KDD Cup 1999 data (The 1999 Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition) [4] . Lee et al. [2] used Ripper to mine some detection rules from the attribute sets and to build misuse detection models. Eskin et al. [5] used unsupervised methods, namely, cluster based estimation, k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) and one class Support Vector Machines (SVM) for network intrusion detection. Jin et al. [6] utilized the covariance matrices of sequential samples to detect multiple network attacks. In our previous work [7] , we used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for network intrusion detection based on the KDD Cup 1999 data.
Data involved in current computer networks increases very fast and is naturally massive. In experiments carried out by MIT Lincoln Lab for the 1998 DARPA evaluation [3] , for example, network traffic over 7 weeks contains four gigabytes of compressed binary tcpdump data that were processed into about five million connection records. A practical IDS, therefore, should have the capacity of fast processing large amounts of network data so that actions for response can be taken as soon as possible before substantial damage is done. Most existing network intrusion detection methods [2, [5] [6] [7] detect intrusions by using all the 41 attributes constructed from network traffic data. However, some of the attributes may be redundant or even noise and therefore decrease the detection system's performance. Empirical evidence from the attribute selection literature also shows that redundant information as well as irrelevant attributes should be eliminated for efficient classification tasks [8] . Sung and Mukkamala [9] used ANN and SVM to identify some important attributes based on the performance comparison. For example, an attribute is identified as important if the detection accuracy decreases and/or computation time increases after the attribute is deleted from the training set. In this paper, we used different criteria to select key attributes. Filter (e.g., Information Gain) and Wrapper (with Bayesian Networks and decision trees classifiers) based attribute selection methods are used to select some key subsets from the 41 attributes. The subsets of attributes are then used for fast intrusion detection. This largely simplifies the detection problem because only a smaller set of attributes is required to extract from raw network traffic and to process in detection step. The empirical results based on KDD Cup 1999 data show that only using 10 attributes, the detection accuracy almost remains the same or even becomes better compared with that of using all the 41 attributes with both Bayesian Networks (BN) and decision trees (C4.5) classifiers. To further validate our methods, we used the 10 key attributes that were identified for DoS attacks based on KDD Cup 1999 data to detect DDoS attacks in a real network. Experimental results based on the real DDoS attack data also demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our methods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the attribute selection schemes as well as intrusion detection methods. The experiments based on KDD Cup 1999 data are given in detail in Section 3. The experiments based on some real data are also described in this section. Concluding remarks follow in Section 4.
Attribute selection and intrusion detection schemes

Attribute selection schemes
One of the central problems in intrusion detection is identifying a representative set of attributes from which to construct a classification model. Attribute selection algorithms fall into two broad categories: the filter model or the wrapper model [10] . The filter model relies on general characteristics of the training data to select some attributes without involving any learning algorithm. The wrapper model, on the other hand, requires one predetermined learning algorithm in attribute selection and uses its performance to evaluate and determine which attributes are selected. For each new subset of features, the wrapper model needs to learn a classifier. It tends to find attributes that are best suited to the predetermined learning algorithm resulting in superior learning performance, but it also tends to be more computationally expensive than the filter model [10] . To facilitate comparison, in this paper, we use both kinds of attribute selection scheme, namely, information gain based filter model and wrapper based model. 
where ( | )
P y x is the posterior probabilities of Y given the values of X. The information gain is thus defined as
. By calculating information gain, we can rank the correlations of each attribute to the class and select key attributes based on this ranking.
Wrapper based attribute selection.
For wrapper based attribute selection, we use Bayesian networks and decision trees (C4.5) as classifiers that will be described in next subsections. The classifiers used for the wrapper based attribute selection, in fact, are usually employed as intrusion detection schemes in detection step because the classifiers used during attribute selection step always best suit for classification.
Intrusion detection schemes 2.2.1. Bayesian networks based intrusion detection.
A Bayesian network is used to model a domain containing uncertainty in some manner [11] . It is a probabilistic graphical model that represents a set of variables and their probabilistic independencies. In intrusion detection, for example, a Bayesian network could represent the probabilistic relationships between attribute sets and types of intrusions. Given an attribute vector of an instance, the Bayesian network can also be used to compute its probabilities of the presence of various classes (normal or individual type of intrusions).
Formally, Bayesian networks are Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAG) whose nodes represent variables, and whose arcs encode conditional dependencies between the variables. Each node contains the states of the random variable that it represents and a Conditional Probability Table (CPT) . The CPT of a node contains probabilities of the node being in a specific state given the states of its parents. The parent-child relationship between nodes in a Bayesian network indicates the direction of causality between the corresponding variables. That is, the variable represented by the child node is causally dependent on the ones represented by its parents. There are some efficient algorithms that can be used to perform inference and learning in Bayesian networks [11] .
Suppose there is an arc from node A to another node B, A is called a parent of B, and thus B is a child of A. The set of parent nodes of a node i X is denoted by ( ) i parents X . A directed acyclic graph is a Bayesian Network relative to a set of variables if the joint distribution of the node values can be written as the product of the local distributions of each node and its parents:
Given a training set S, learning a Bayesian network is to find a network that best matches S. The learned network represents an approximation to the probability distribution governing the training set. For classification, given a test data vector represented with attributes, we use this network to compute its probability based on which for classification.
Decision tree based intrusion detection.
The decision tree models are found to be very useful in the domain of data mining since they obtain reasonable accuracy and they are relatively inexpensive to compute. Decision tree classifiers are based on the "divide and conquer" strategy to construct an appropriate tree from a given learning set S containing a set of labeled instances. As a well known and widely used algorithm, C4.5 algorithm developed by Quinlan [12] generates accurate decision trees that can be used for effective classification.
C4.5 builds decision trees from a set of training data also with the concept of information entropy. It uses the fact that each attribute of the data can be used to make a decision that splits the data into smaller subsets. C4.5 examines the information gain ratio (can be regarded as normalized Information Gain) that results from choosing an attribute for splitting the data. The attribute with the highest information gain ratio is the one used to make the decision. Given a learning set S and a non class attribute X, the Gain Ratio is defined as:
where i S is the subset of S for which attribute X have a value and | S | is the number of instances in S.
The decision trees are constructed as a set of rules during learning phase. It is then used to predict the classes of new instances based on the rules.
Experiments and analysis
In order to validate the proposed methods, firstly we used KDD Cup 1999 data to select key attributes since the data set has been widely used by many other methods. We then used the selected attributes for detection of DDoS attacks in a real network to further validate our methods.
Experiments on KDD Cup 1999 data
3.1.1. Data sets. The original data contains traffic in a simulated military network. The data includes 7 weeks of training set and 2 weeks of test set that were not from the same probability distribution as the training set. Since the probability distribution is not the same, in our experiments, we only use the training set and sample one part of the data for training and another different part of the data for testing. The raw training set of the data contains about 4 gigabytes of compressed binary tcpdump data of network traffic and it was pre-processed into about 5 million connection records by Lee et al. [2] as KDD Cup 1999 data [4] . A connection is a sequence of TCP packets starting and ending at some well defined times, between which data flows from a source IP address to a target IP address under some well defined protocol [4] . In the data set, each network connection is labeled as either normal, or as an one specific kind of attack.
In KDD Cup 1999 data, each network connection is represented by 41 attributes [4] . The attribute names are listed in Table 1 and the meaning of each attribute can be found in [4] . There are 494,021 connection records in the training set in which 97,278 are normal and 396,744 are attacks. There are 22 types of attacks in total in the data set and these attacks fall into one of 4 categories: (1) DoS: denial-of-service (e.g., teardrop); (2) PROBE: surveillance and other probing (e.g., port scanning); (3) R2L: unauthorized access from a remote machine (e.g., password guessing); (4) U2R: unauthorized access to local superuser (root) privileges by a local unprivileged user (e.g., buffer overflow attacks). Table 2 (the attack data in bold font only has few instances). We performed information gain based and wrapper based attribute selection methods on each training sets using Weka tools that have been developed by University of Waikato [13] . For wrapper based methods, the search method is chosen as best first. The selected attributes for detection of different attack categories with different methods are listed in Table 3 . The attributes that at least two methods simultaneously select are in bold font. From table 3, it is seen that some key attributes remain the same whatever the attack categories are. For example, attribute 5 (number of data bytes from source to destination) usually ranks as very important for detection of all categories of attack. In general, the basic attributes (attribute 1-6) are important for detection of all attack categories. The key attributes are not the same for detection of different attack categories. This is easily understood because each type of attack has its own patterns. For example, attribute 1 (duration: number of seconds of the connection) is an important pattern for R2L and U2R attacks while it is irrelevant for DoS and Probe attacks. Usually it requires a long time for R2L and U2R attacks to login to the system to guess the passwords or compromise some system's vulnerabilities to have the root privilege in a connection. DoS and Probe attacks, however, attack a system usually by sending a large mount of packets in a short time and thus the duration is very short. For each attack category, some attributes are always shown important whatever the attribute selection methods used. For example, attribute 23 (count: number of connections to the same host as the current connection in the past two seconds) is an important pattern for DoS attacks. This is because DoS attacks are to make a computer resource unavailable usually by flooding a network or other means with a very large mount of connections to the same host in a very short time. For Information gain based attribute selection, the selected attributes have a ranking. For example, the DoS attack detection results shown in Table 3 indicate that attribute 5 is more important than attribute 23 which is also more important than attribute 3, and so forth. Based on the results in Table 3 , we use the most 10 common attributes that different methods simultaneously select to form the key set of attributes shown in Table 4 for detection of different categories of attacks. Table 5 . The experiments are performed in a system with 2.66 G Hz dual core CPU and 3.5G RAM memory. The CPU time used for training the models and detecting intrusions is also given in Table 6 . In general, the detection results are ideal when the detection rates are very high while the false positive rates are very low. From Table 5 , it is seen that the models detect high percentage of the DoS, Probe and R2L attacks but not as effective for U2R attacks. This is consistent with the results of many other papers because the behavior of U2R attacks is very similar with that of normal operations. From Table 5 , we can also see that the detection results only using the 10 attributes almost remain the same or even become better than those using all the 41 attributes. This shows that many of the 41 attributes are irrelevant and only a smaller set of attributes is required to extract from raw network traffic for detection of individual attacks. It is easily seen from Table 6 that using fewer attributes can also largely save computational time for both training and detection. In next subsection, we thus only extract 10 attributes for DDoS attack detection in real networks. 
Experiments in real environments
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack is one of the major threats in current computer networks. It is an attempt to make a computer resource unavailable to the intended users. The means to, motives for, and targets of a DoS attack may vary, but it generally consists of the concerted, malevolent efforts of a person or persons to prevent an internet site or service from functioning efficiently. Instead of using a lot of attributes that may decrease the efficiency of detection process, we only use 10 key attributes described in above Section for DDoS attack detection in real environments.
We collected some major DDoS attack tools and experienced them in our laboratory to collect a set of DDoS attack network traffic. The attack tools are Trinoo, TFN, Stacheldraht, TFN2K and Mstream. Using these tools, we implement DDoS attacks with ICMP flood, SYN flood, UDP flood, Steam (TCP-ACK flood) and Smurf style attacks. A large set of normal as well as DDoS attack network traffic are then collected for analysis.
We transformed tcpdump traffic into connection records with only 10 key attributes for detecting DDoS attacks as well as with all the 41 attributes for results comparison. We used Bayesian networks and C4.5 to build the models and detect DDoS attacks. In the experiments, we randomly selected 30,000 normal connections and 36,380 DDoS attack connections to form the training set. For test set, we randomly selected 30000 different normal connections and different 33,900 DDoS attack connections. Table 7 summarizes the testing results with Bayesian Networks and C4.5 based on only 10 attributes as well as on all the 41 attributes. From Table 7 , it is seen that the detection results based on the real networks are consistent with those based on the KDD Cup 1999 data for DDoS detection. The detection results using only 10 attributes remain the same or even become better than the results using all the 41 attributes.
Concluding Remarks
Instead of using all the 41 attributes that most related papers used before, in this paper, we select a key subset of attributes for intrusion detection based on several attribute selection schemes, namely, information gain and wrapper with Bayesian networks and with decision trees (C4.5) methods. Based on KDD Cup 1999 data, we selected subsets of key attributes for detection of each attack category: DoS, Probe, R2L and U2R. The detection accuracy remains the same or even has some improvement based on only 10 attributes comparing with using all the 41 attributes. Using fewer attributes, therefore, not only enhance detection accuracy, but also improve detection efficiency since smaller data is required to process. Moreover, the intrusion detection step largely saves computational expense with smaller set of attributes. To further validate our methods, we used the attribute selection results based on KDD Cup 1999 data for detection of DDoS attacks based on a real data set. We extract only 10 attributes from the raw network traffic for representing each network connection. Bayesian networks and decision trees (C4.5) are then used for detecting intrusions. Experimental results show that with only 10 attributes, the detection rates almost remain the same or are even better than those using all the 41 attributes. The small set of attributes thus can be regarded as a useful reference for further analysis and detection of DDoS attacks.
For our future work, we will address the question of how many attributes are appropriate for intrusion detection. In addition, we are developing an online self-adaptive intrusion detection model that includes two modules. The first module is to extract several key attributes from raw network traffic for fast attack detection. We also plan to use some attributes that can be formed before a connection is finished for real-time intrusion detection. The other module is to upgrade the detection model dynamically and automatically for addressing the concept drift problem.
